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When measuring inequality over two attributes, it may be of practical
interest to express inequality as a function of the underlying level of inequal-
ity in each attribute. This note provides, for the class of relative bidimen-
sional inequality indices, a decomposition of inequality into two univariate
Atkinson-Kolm-Sen [AKS] indices 1 and a third statistic which depends on
the joint distribution of resources.
1 Notation and definitions
A Population consists of n individuals. Individual i has resources xi
.
=
(xi1, xi2), where xi ∈ R2++. The joint distribution is a matrix X
.
=
⎡
⎢⎣
x1
...
xn
⎤
⎥⎦ ∈
Mn, the set of all n×2 matrices with strictly positive elements. Accordingly,
the jth column of X, Xj, gives a distribution (an n × 1 vector) for the jth
attribute in the population, and we also write X = [X1 X2] .
A bidimensional inequality index is a real valued function I(X) : Mn →
R+. Underlying I is a social welfare function W (X) : Mn → R. We take
W (.) to be the average of individual welfare levels:
ADD : W (X) = 1n
P
i u(xi) for any X (additive separability).
CON : W (.) is continuous in X.
PAR : W (.) is strictly increasing in all its arguments (Pareto principle).
EQUAL : W (.) is a strictly quasi-concave function (preference for equal-
ity).
RSINV : If Λ is an 2×2 diagonal matrix with strictly positive elements,
then W (XA) =W (XB)⇐⇒W (XAΛ) =W (XBΛ), (ratio-scale invariance).
The above axioms onW entail that u(.) is continuous, increasing, concave
and ratio-scale invariant. In what follows, we shall refer to the set of axioms
ADD, CON , PAR, EQUAL and RSINV as the basic axioms.
Let µ .= (µ1, µ2) denote the vector of sample means and let w
o .=W (X),
be the level of welfare attained by X. Then, if W (.) satisfies the basic ax-
ioms, we may define a scalar θ(X) in the unit interval, such that u(θµ) =
1
n
P
i u(xi) = w
o. Starting from a distribution X, a fraction θ of the sum-
total of each attribute would lead to the same level of welfare as X, provided
each attribute were equally distributed in the population. Therefore, θ is a
1See Atkinson (1970), Sen (1973), Kolm (1977) and Tsui (1995).
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measure of equality in X, and
I(X) = 1− θ(X) (1)
is the corresponding relative inequality index (Kolm, 1977). Likewise, below
we shall define equality indices θj for each separate attribute. Our aim is
to decompose θ as a function of statistics θ1, θ2, pertaining to the marginal
distributions and a term κ which depends on the correlation between the two
attributes.
Denote by F12 the cumulative distribution function of X, and by Fj the
marginal distribution of the j-th attribute Xj. By Sklar’s theorem (Sklar,
1959), there exists a copula function c : [0, 1]×[0, 1]→ [0, 1] such that for any
(x1, x2), F12(x1, x2) = c[F1(x1), F2(x2)]. The copula captures the association
between the two variables, and the joint distribution F12 may be identified
with its two marginal distributions and its copula function.
In general terms, we shall say that θ(X) is decomposable into two indices
θ1, θ2, and a measure of association κ if there exist four R → R functions
h(.), g1(.), g2(.), and χ(.), where h, g1, and g2 are monotonically increasing,
such that:
h[θ(F12)] = g
1[θ1(F1)] + g
2[θ2(F2)] + χ[κ(c(F1, F2))] (2)
where κ(.) measures the association between attributes via the copula func-
tion.
Note that there are diﬀerent ways to define equality in a given dimension,
in particular with regard to whether the distribution over the other attribute
has been equalized. Two polar cases may thus be defined. First, consider
a situation where only x2 is redistributed in the population. Then, we may
define a scalar ρ2(X) such that
1
n
P
i u(xi1, ρ2µ2) = w
o. Hence, ρ2 is a measure
of equality in X2 holding the distribution X1 constant. Next, there exists
a scalar γ1(X), such that u(γ1µ1, ρ2µ2) =
1
n
P
i u(xi1, ρ2µ2). The scalar γ1
is the fraction of µ1 that, if equally distributed in the population, would
attain the same level of welfare as X, conditional on everyone receiving an
endowment ρ2µ2 of x2. Both γ1 and ρ1 provide measures of equality in the
first attribute, and we derive below inequalities relating γj and ρj.
When u(.) is additively separable in x1 and x2 we show that γj = ρj, and θ
may be decomposed in terms of γ1 and γ2. In the more general context where
u(.) is not separable across attributes, we show that θ may be decomposed
in terms of γ1, γ2, and a third index κ that captures the correlation between
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the two attributes. Finally, we generalize our decomposition in the context
of p > 2 attributes.
2 Inequality and the correlation between at-
tributes
It may certainly be advocated that changes in the joint distribution which
increase the correlation between attributes for given marginal distributions,
ought to modify inequality. Formally, let xl and xm denote any two rows
of X, and define yi
.
= xi for all i 6= l,m and ylj .= max{xlj;xmj}, ymj .=
min{xlj;xmj} j = 1, 2; following Tsui (1999), we shall state that Y is a
correlation increasing transformation (CIT ) of X. Given that a CIT does
not aﬀect the marginal distributions, it amounts to a transfer which increases
the rank correlation between attributes (i.e. Kendall’s Tau). The next axiom
formalizes the argument W (Y ) ≤W (X) :
CITAV : For any X and Y, if Y is a CIT of X, then W (Y ) ≤ W (X),
(aversion to correlation increasing transformations).
To provide some intuition for the results to follow, suppose x1 is income
and x2 is health. With u12 < 0, the marginal utility of income is higher
for the unhealthy. Therefore, a redistribution of income from a person in
good health to a less healthy one may increase welfare, even if the latter is
initially wealthier. The following lemma (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 1982)
formalizes this argument.
Lemma Assume W (.) satisfies the basic axioms. If in addition W has
an aversion (preference) for CITs, then u12 ≤ 0 (u12 ≥ 0).
If W (.) satisfies the basic axioms then u(.) is one of three forms (Aczél,
1988; Tsui, 1995):
u(xi1, xi2)
.
= xαi1x
β
i2 α, β > 0, α+ β ≤ 1 (3)
u(xi1, xi2)
.
= −xαi1xβi2 α, β < 0 (4)
u(xi1, xi2)
.
= α lnxi1 + β lnxi2 α, β > 0 (5)
The first of these forms has u12 > 0, i.e. W (.) is increasing in CITs. For the
second form u12 < 0, while for the latter u12 = 0, i.e. W (.) is insensitive to
CITs. We begin with this simpler case.
4
Under (5), u(x1, x2) is additively separable in x1 and x2; accordingly,
wo = α ln θµ1 + β ln θµ2 = α ln γ1µ1 + β ln γ2µ2 (6)
Upon defining ω .= α/(α+ β), we obtain the elasticity decomposition
ln θ(X) = ω ln γ1(X1) + (1− ω) ln γ2(X2) when u12 = 0 (7)
so that a 1% increase in equality of the distribution X1 results in a ω %
increase in the overall level of equality θ. Notice also here that ρj = γj =
exp
£
1
n
P
i lnxij − lnµj
¤
.
For the general case u12 6= 0, it is usually not possible to modify the
distribution X1 while holding γ2 constant. The elasticity decomposition is
given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Assume W (.) satisfies the basic axioms. Then
ln θ(X) = ω ln γ1(X1) + (1− ω) ln γ2(X2) +
1
(α+ β)
lnκ(X) (8)
where γj is an AKS index for Xj and κ is given by
κ .=
n
P
i x
α
i1x
β
i2P
i x
α
i1
P
i x
β
i2
(9)
Proof : Consider first (3). From the definition of θ, it follows that wo =
(θµ1)
α(θµ2)
β = (γ1µ1)
α(ρ2µ2)
β. Therefore, (α+ β) ln θ = α ln γ1 + β ln ρ2. In
other terms,
ln θ = ω ln γ1 + (1− ω) ln γ2 + (1− ω) ln(ρ2/γ2) (10)
Likewise, wo = (ρ1µ1)
α(γ2µ2)
β = 1n
P
i(ρ1µ1)
αxβi2. Hence,
γ2 =
1
µ2
Ã
1
n
X
i
xβi2
!1/β
(11)
Since wo = 1n
P
i x
α
i1x
β
i2 =
1
n
P
i x
α
i1(ρ2µ2)
β, we obtain
ρ2 =
1
µ2
ÃP
i x
α
i1x
β
i2P
i x
α
i1
!1/β
(12)
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Together, (11) and (12) give (1− ω) ln(ρ2/γ2) = (lnκ)/(α+ β), which com-
pletes the proof for (3). For (4), it is readily verified that γ2 and ρ2 are also
given as in (11) and (12) above. ¤
If Y is a CIT of X, it is the case that Fj(Yj) = Fj(Xj). Hence, γj(Y ) =
γj(X). On the basis of (8), we therefore obtain
ln θ(Y )− ln θ(X) = 1
(α+ β)
[lnκ(Y )− lnκ(X)] (13)
Since κ is a measure of association between the two attributes, it is desirable
that this function be rising in correlation increasing transformations. The
next proposition formalizes this argument.
Proposition 2: If Y is a CIT of X, then κ(Y ) ≥ κ(X).
Proof : For j = 1, 2 let xj < xj. If Y is a CIT of X, we may take xl
.
=
(x1, x2), xm
.
= (x1, x2), yl
.
= (x1, x2), ym
.
= (x1, x2) and yi
.
= xi for all i 6= l,m.
Since the marginal distributions are unaﬀected by CITs, it follows from (9)
that κ(Y ) ≥ κ(X) when the diﬀerence ∆ .= xα1xβ2 + xα1xβ2 − xα1xβ2 − xα1xβ2 is
positive. Since ∆ .= (xα1 − xα1 )(xβ2 − xβ2), we have that ∆ ≥ 0 when α and β
are of the same sign. ¤
Returning to (13) we note that when the social welfare function is averse
to correlation increasing transformations (α, β < 0), a CIT results in a re-
duction in θ, that is, an increase in inequality. In other terms, the change in
inequality that results from a CIT is captured via κ.
3 Some inequalities
Recall that ρ2 is a measure of equality in X2 holding the distribution X1
constant, whereas γ2 measures the level of equality in X2 having equalized
the distribution X1. Consider (4) whereW (.) is averse to CITs. Then, if the
correlation between xα1 and x
β
2 is positive, we expect the level of equality in
X2 to be greater after equalizing the distribution X1 than before, i.e. that
γ2 ≥ ρ2. We have:
Proposition 3: In the context of (3), γj ≤ ρj iﬀ the correlation between
xα1 and x
β
2 is positive. For (4), γj ≥ ρj iﬀ the correlation between xα1 and
xβ2 is positive. For (5), γj = ρj.
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Recall that κ is a measure of association between x1 and x2. It is greater
than (less than) unity when xα1 and x
β
2 are positively (negatively) correlated.
The index κ is a simple transform of the ratio of ρj to γj :
κ =
µ
ρ2
γ2
¶β
=
µ
ρ1
γ1
¶α
(14)
In the context of (3), α, β > 0 while in (4) α, β < 0, from which the results
of the proposition follow.
4 Generalization
A final point we turn to is the decomposition of inequality in the general
context of p > 2 attributes. Define xi
.
= (xi1, ..., xip). For u(xi) to satisfy
the basic axioms it must take one of the following forms: u(xi)
.
= xα1i1 · · · · ·
xαpip , αj > 0 for all j, and
P
j αj ≤ 1; u(xi)
.
= −xα1i1 · · · · · xαpip , αj < 0 for all j
and finally, u(xi)
.
=
P
j αj lnxij, where αj > 0 for all j. Propositions 1 and
2 generalize to higher dimensions. The decomposition of inequality in the
context of p attributes is given byÃX
j
αj
!
ln θ =
X
j
αj ln γj + lnκ (15)
κ .=
n
P
i x
α1
i1 · · · · · xαpipP
i x
α1
i1 · · · · ·
P
i x
αp
ip
(16)
As before, γj denotes an AKS equality index for the distribution Xj, whereas
now κ is a function of the product moment between the variables xα11 , ..., x
αp
p
thus generalizing the earlier bivariate measure of association (9).
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